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A ﬁrm may allow customers to learn the value of its product prior to buying it. This in-
creases their willingness to pay, even though it also leads some not to buy. That strategy may
also be used as a competitive tool to increase its product’s attractiveness.
This paper examines competition between ex-ante identical ﬁrms that sell horizontally dif-
ferentiated and mutually exclusive experience goods. Customers incur set-up costs when buy-
ing a good, but those set-up costs are partly recoverable if they then decide to buy the product
of a competitor.
The main conclusion from this paper is that while a ﬁrm that gives information about its
product makes higher proﬁts than a competing ﬁrm that chooses not to do so, a ﬁrm may
however choose that last option in order to avoid being in direct competition with a ﬁrm that is
more open about the value of its product.
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11 Introduction
“Shareware is a marketing method, not a type of software or even strictly just a
distribution method. When software is marketed through normal retail channels, you
are forced to pay for the product before you’ve even seen it. The shareware marketing
method lets you try a program before you buy. Since you’ve tried the program, you
know whether it will meet your needs before you pay for it. A shareware program is
just like a program you ﬁnd in major stores, catalogs, and other places where software
is purchased; except you get to use it, on your own computer, before paying for it.”
Association of Shareware Professionals
There are two ways to sell software: The shareware marketing system (“SMS”) lets customers
learn the value of the product before incurring costs to install it, learn how it works and integrate
it into their system (“set-up costs”). The shelfware marketing system requires customers to buy
the product and incur set-up costs before knowing its value. Firms marketing their software as a
shareware have to design two different products, one that will be the try-out version of the other.
They therefore not only have to sell the software, but must distribute the try-out version and then
sell to customers who decide to buy the full software. The Internet enlarged the type of settings
where a SMS can be used proﬁtably because the Internet lowers distribution costs for information
goods; given low distribution and storage costs, policies that are based on distributing samples of a
products or on accepting returns are less costly than before. There is also one other effect at work
that makes SMS attractive: the rise in the software set-up costs. Indeed, more and more goods
must be customized, ﬁt to the speciﬁc needs of different types of customers, and it is the customers
who must ask for, or make, the changes themselves - which result in additional buying costs. This
makes customers reluctant to buy a new product and in order to overcome this reluctance, ﬁrms
adopt policies that consist in offering a “light” version of the product. That one does not necessitate
high set-up costs but allows to evaluate the quality of the “full” version. Allowing customers to
try a product provides an alternative to advertising, as that method is less costly than traditional
informative advertising. Indeed, advertising became less efﬁcient in markets like those generated
by the Internet, which doesn’t provide for a way to reach each customers’ categories at a low price
while it encourages a fragmentation of customers’ tastes. Finally, this marketing system alleviates
the moral hazard problem of the ﬁrm, as it is difﬁcult to misrepresent the value of your product
when you let potential customers try it. This moral hazard problem is prominent on the Internet,
which still is an unknown and dangerous territory to explore for most consumers.
Software marketing and book selling are two examples of the use of a SMS: A crippleware is
a version of a software with reduced functionality. It can be used for a limited number of time
or during a limited time period. Either you cannot continue to use it if you decide not to buy a
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amples of crippleware include WebExpert 2000 of Visicom Media, a website-designing software,
Qualcomm’s Eudora, a mail reader, Opera Software A/S’s Opera, a web browser, and Fritz6Demo
of Chessbase GmbH, a chess playing software. Firms usually set up a SMS to give the option to try
the crippled version before buying the full product. They may be able to know which clients tried
their products and which of them didn’t by leaving a trace on the user’s computer that, for most
of them, is difﬁcult to detect and erase, and thus segregate customers based on their behavior prior
to purchasing. While many software ﬁrms choose to offer crippled version of their product, they
constitute only a small part of the market; the big software makers such as Microsoft do not see
the use of that marketing method. The crippleware are present in competitive markets with no big
established player.
SMS are not limited to software of course: Barnes and Noble, an American bookseller, set
up coffee-shops in its bookstores, so that customers can comfortably browse books they picked
up and make their choice. This is in contrast to Fnac in France, where the customer is usually
discouraged from staying too long in the bookstore. Even though a “reading room” may sometime
be provided, customers who want to read a book usually have to stay up in the aisles in the middle
of the crowd. In the ﬁrst case, books are sold in a SMS (customers can “try” the books), in the
second case, they are sold as a commodity. While the difference may be cultural, return policies and
accommodations for readers may vary a lot among different bookstores in the same city. This shows
how no marketing system can be said to truly dominate the other, and marketing systems are not
only cultural. The second part of this paper will deal with the characteristics of competition between
a “Barnes and Noble” bookseller and a “Fnac” bookstore, or between a “Microsoft’s Outlook” and
a “Qualcomm’s Eudora”.
The shareware industry and the motivations for selling software as shareware were studied from
otherperspectives. Sharewaremaybeusedasamarketpre-emptiondeviceinamarketwithnetwork
externalities – if part of the value of the software is in the number of people who use it, then letting
people try it for free will increase the number of people using it and thus the probability they will
ﬁnd its value to be high. For example, a basic version of Grisoft’s AVG anti-virus software is
distributed for free so as to protect Grisoft’s paying customers from the viruses that may otherwise
be sent by their unprotected correspondents. Shareware may also be used in standardization battles
– this is the case in the battle between Microsoft’s proprietary Windows Media digital content
format and RealNetworks, Apple and others who support the open-standard MPEG4. Both sides
distribute free readers for their formats, the stake being the control of the entertainment services
over the Internet. Distributing shareware can also be an entry-facilitating strategy by a new entrant
in a market with an established dominant player – Microsoft distributed its Internet Explorer web
browser for free so as to displace Netscape which had been able previously to sell its software at
higher and higher prices as it was becoming dominant on the market and beneﬁted from network
effects.
There are few studies on the shareware industry. The present paper focuses on ‘crippleware’
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are two types of crippleware: trial-versions of a product that are basically the same as the original
version in all its aspects but expire in a limited period of time, and stripped-down versions with
some functions disabled. Most crippleware is a combination of the two. This paper assimilates the
two types of crippleware, even though the second type raises the issue of what the optimal quality
of the stripped-down version should be; this has an effect on the probability of subsequent buying of
the full version, but also on welfare as there is no time limit on its use. Heiman and Muller (2001)
look at the effect of competition on the design of the shareware offering (length of the trial period,
usage restrictions), and show how competition will tend to increase the duration and quality of the
demonstration if that policy increases the probability that the software is tested. They also contrast
industrial software products, where demonstration is personalized, with software distributed via the
Internet, where personalization is not possible. Haruvy and Prasad (1998) study shareware as a
product strategy in the presence of network externalities, and propose guidelines for using ‘limited
versions’ strategies in the software markets. They underline the trade-off involved between the
cannibalization of the commercial version of a software by its free version, and the possibility
to raise price for the commercial version due to the positive effect of network externalities (the
free versions of the software that are in circulation increase the value of the software to paying
customers). They do not consider the beneﬁt of encouraging customers in trying the software and
learning their valuation for it, and focus instead on the optimal setting of the quality of the limited
version product. It must be high enough to encourage customers who have a low valuation for
the full product to use the free version, while it must be low enough to encourage high-valuation
customers to purchase the commercial version. An example of differentiated quality is Adobe’s
Acrobat Reader which is distributed for free but only allows to read and print PDF ﬁles while
Acrobat’s full version allows to create PDF documents.
While the shareware market has been estimated as a $300 million industry (Foley, 1995), it has
not been the subject of many economic studies because its model is not well understood; many
software authors offer a fully featured product for free with an implicit agreement that if the user
likes it he will pay a fee for it. That type of agreement does not readily enter in economic models.
Takeyama (1994) sees shareware as a way for individual software authors to make money on a soft-
ware they developed for individual use or as part of another project. It can also be a David’s tactic
when faced with the Goliath marketing resources of big software companies. She considers share-
ware as a cottage industry that provides a side revenue for professional programmers, and from her
survey of shareware developers, very few shareware are successful and their price is about 4 times
lower than comparable commercial software programs. Haruvy and Prasad (1998) mention that the
quality of shareware is generally lower than that of their commercial versions because of a lack of
documentation and technical support, lower reliability due to the lack of extensive debugging, and a
higher possibility of virus infection. However, both Takeyama and Foley focus on a particular type
of shareware, more commonly called ‘freeware’, where the incentive to pay are very low because
the full version of the software does not differ from the try-out version except for giving right to
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ware as a software marketing system, but they are a bit dated: the shareware marketing system has
become more popular and used even by established, ‘Goliath’ software companies in recent years.
The conclusion of this paper uses the terms of this model to explain that evolution.
Review of the literature The review of the literature is divided in three parts. A ﬁrst part looks at
the issue of information disclosure for a monopoly, another deals with the same issue for competing
ﬁrms and the third part shows how the choice of a SMS may be motivated from other perspectives.
A SMS provides information to a consumer about the value of a product, and this paper thus
deals with the well-known issue of voluntary information disclosure. Milgrom (1981) and Okuno-
Fujiwara et alii (1990) look at the case where a ﬁrm has to choose whether to disclose information
about its product to the consumer. The revelation of information inﬂuences the decision to buy not
only because the consumer learns the value of the product, but also because the decision to reveal
information itself acts as a signal about the value of the product. Grossman (1981) also looks at the
dilemma faced by a seller who knows the value of his product and knows that buyers will attribute
to it the lowest a-priori if he does not reveal it to them before selling. In the present paper, the value
of the product to one speciﬁc customer is not known to the ﬁrm selling it and signaling problems
thus play no role. Shavell (1994) studies the incentives for a ﬁrm to acquire information about the
value of its own product but the cost to acquire such information is assumed to be prohibitively high
in the present paper and the ﬁrm thus does not wish to acquire it. That cost is high because while the
ﬁrm may know the average value of its product to consumers, each consumer attributes a different
value to the product. Learning the value of the product to a customer may involve motivating him
to reveal his valuation when there is no independent way to estimate it, and
this raises the cost of that information since the ﬁrm then faces incentive problems on the part of
the customer. That information is however valuable to the customer because it allows him to decide
whether to incur set-up costs in installing and learning how to use the product. If he is risk averse,
that information is valuable even in the absence of set-up costs. It therefore makes sense for the ﬁrm
to let customers learn their valuation for the product by themselves. This paper views the shareware
pricing system as it is used on the Internet as a direct consequence of the prohibitive costs that
would be involved in learning how each individual customers values the ﬁrm’s product. Since the
demonstration is not personalized, and the ﬁrm does not have direct contact with the customer prior
to sale, the cost of revealing information about the product is relatively low too. Shavell (1994)
analyzed the revelation of information as a way to prevent socially undesirable investment in the
product (learning, installation cost, etc.). However, the conclusions of his model do not apply here;
it is the ﬁrm which decides what is going to be the cost to the customer of acquiring the information
– the ﬁrm designs the try-out version of the shareware and chooses its price – and there is therefore
no independent decision on the part of the customer whether to learn the value of the product or
not: either the ﬁrm allows him to do so before buying, or it does not offer him the possibility to
learn the value of the product. Lewis and Sappington (1994) are closer to this paper as they study
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for the seller’s product. They however do not determine at what price that information will be sold,
while this model introduces such a price that is set by the seller. This is important because it will
guide the design of the try-out version of a shareware: the price of that try-out version is most of
the time not monetary, and consists in the cost of downloading it, the need to register it, or the
user-friendliness of its design (see the discussion, part 5). The only choice in the present model
is between providing perfect information about the product or no information at all. Lewis and
Sappington show that the seller will choose either to provide full information or no information at
all even when the seller can choose how informative its information about the product will be by
varying the probability with which it will lead the customer to learn the value of the product. Che
(1996) studies a monopoly’s return policy and emphasizes screening as a rationale for using a SMS.
In his model, screening is beneﬁcial for the ﬁrms because it allows them to economize on retail
costs by selling only to customers who are satisﬁed with the product. In the present paper, the focus
is on buying costs, i.e. retail costs from the point of view of customers. Additionally, Che (1996)
does not look at policies that would consist in allowing customers to buy a product and waive their
option to return it if they are not satisﬁed. In this paper, customers may choose to buy the product
directly without trying, even when trying is allowed. Crémer (1984) looks at a two period model
where in a ﬁrst period the customer learns the value of the product, and chooses whether to buy it
in a second period. This model is quite similar to his in the case where the ﬁrm can discriminate
in the second period between ﬁrst time buyers and second time buyers. It differs when that type of
discrimination is not possible. This is because in Crémer’s model the ﬁrm is free to change the price
of its good from periods to periods, so that customers do not face in a second period the same price
for the good that they tried in a ﬁrst period. In the present paper, customers have a choice between
buying the good directly at a given price, or trying it and then buying it at the same given price, the
price of the “full” version of the good.
Competition between two ﬁrms that have two marketing systems available introduces some
complications compared to the existing literature. Bouckaert and Degryse (2000) look at competi-
tion between two ﬁrms, an “expert” and a “non-expert” that sell horizontally differentiated goods,
and use a simple pricing system. The expert is guaranteed to fulﬁll your need if you decide to
buy his product, while the product of the “non-expert” may not be satisfactory. The competition
dynamics between those two types of ﬁrms is quite similar to that in this model. Their “expert” cor-
responds to the “shareware” and to their “non-expert” corresponds the “shelfware”. Their search for
an equilibrium of the competition game is however greatly facilitated by the fact that ﬁrms compete
based on one instrument only, the price of the product sold. In the present model, the shareware has
two instruments, the price of the light version, and the price of the full version of the product, which
complicates the search for an equilibrium. Krishna and Winston (2000) study competition between
two ﬁrms selling exclusive experience goods that require high personal investment. Their results
apply to the competition between two shelfware – proposition 6 – and serves as a benchmark for
the study of settings where one ﬁrm or both use a SMS – propositions 7, 8 and 9. Those proposition
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those pricing systems are not uni-dimensional, customers can switch between products, although
at a cost, and learn their value along the way. Baye and Morgan (1999) also present that type of
mixed-strategy Bertrand equilibrium, but this paper is original in that it presents differentiated equi-
librium where one ﬁrm uses a classical, shelfware pricing system while the other uses a shareware
pricing system. Its conclusions are interesting as it shows a shelfware is always bought ﬁrst while
the shareware is tried by consumers who are disappointed with the shelfware. This corresponds to
stylized facts in the industry, where many software products are sold pre-packaged with hardware as
default, and consumers only choose to try other products—most of them sold as shareware—when
they are dissatisﬁed with what they bought originally.
This paper is original because it studies competition between ﬁrms that have a choice whether
to reveal information about their product or not, and that choice is not a signal about the quality of
their product. It introduces set-up costs as a motivation for revealing information about the product
in the monopoly case, and looks at the inﬂuence of switching costs on the competition game. Many
of the results in this paper depend critically on the assumption there are set-up costs when installing
a product, and switching costs when choosing to buy another product. Set-up costs are assumed
to be null for the try-out version of a shareware, while they are signiﬁcant for the full-version of
a shareware or for a shelfware. Additionally, it is assumed that the cost of installing a product is
lower for a consumer who already installed and used a competing product than for one who did
not; when you switch to a new product, you incur only a fraction of that product’s set-up costs.
While this second assumption does not pose problem – it is quite obvious that having learned how
to use a product will facilitate your learning how to use a product in the same category later – the
ﬁrst assumption must be justiﬁed; it is important to understand that it is merely a way to convey
the simple fact that set-up costs will be higher for a full-version with all its functionalities than
for a light-version. That light version is easier to download, does not require registration, offers
only limited functionalities and allows to test only a limited range of the product’s capabilities.
It is therefore much easier to learn, and anyway, no customer will incur high set-up costs to use
it because either the trial period is too short to make it worth-wile, or they will soon realize they
had better buy the full product because the light version is too limited. That assumption isn’t even
essential for the results in this paper to hold; set-up costs for the try-out version could be introduced.
The importance of set-up costs is another matter for debate; do people care much about set-up
costs when considering buying a piece of software? People seem quite ready to download software
on the Internet, even when that software responds only to transient needs, and therefore set-up costs
must be pretty low. That observation stems from a confusion between downloading a software and
actually using it. Most software is not used to the full extent of its capacities because the investment
in learning to do so is too high. People care about set-up costs, and this is why most do not incur
them. The full value of the software product can be extracted only if those set-up costs are incurred.
In this paper, the choice is binary: either you incur set-up costs and get the full value of the product,
or you don’t and get no utility from the product. This is a simpliﬁcation from the reality where the
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model assumes people download the try-out version of a shareware merely to test whether it ﬁts
their needs and can work with their current computer system, but will choose to really learn how to
use it only if that test is satisfactory, in which case they buy the full version of the software: learning
comes after buying. There are two reasons for this: one is of practicality – the full version usually
comes with better support for learning – the other one is of necessity – the crippled version of the
software does not give access to all the features that could be learned by the user, it is usually not
very powerful and thus does not require much learning.
While previous model consider the price of the information about the product’s value to be
a redundant variable, and set it at zero, this model introduces it as a variable – the price of the
try-out version of shareware – and determines in what range it can be set. The discussion at the
end of this paper gives an interpretation of that price: it is the utility of the try-out version of the
shareware, which is a function of its design and availability more than of its monetary price. This
model thus provides guidelines on how the try-out version of a shareware, but also the shareware
distribution system, must be designed to provide the required utility to customers; a try-out version
is not necessarily free.
Outline The ﬁrst part of this paper examines a monopoly’s mechanism choice, the second part
deals with the features of the competition between ﬁrms depending on their choice of marketing
mechanisms, and the third part is a study of how they will choose what marketing mechanism to
adopt. The ﬁrst part shows that a rationale for using a shareware marketing system is to enhance the
marketability of horizontally differentiated experience goods that require signiﬁcant unrecoverable
investments from the part of the buyer. This means that a SMS will be used when customers
must incur high search, installation, and learning costs (“set-up costs”) before getting to know the
value of a product. Following the study of monopoly is a study of duopoly competition between
different marketing systems, one of them leading the agent to become informed on the value of the
product before buying. The degree of compatibility, or similarities between competing products
then becomes important as it facilitates switching from one product to another. That switching can
be relatively inexpensive, because having used one product helps in learning how to use the other.
This part on duopoly competition leads to some counter-intuitive insights into how a ﬁrm that lets
people get information about its product will compete with a ﬁrm that sells to uninformed clients.
Firms that choose a shareware marketing system may end up being a second choice and having a
smaller market share than the ﬁrms that choose a shelfware marketing system but they will make
higher proﬁts. The last part on the choice of marketing systems shows how two ﬁrms may choose
different marketing systems; the equilibrium of a two stage game where ﬁrms choose the marketing
mechanism and then the prices of their products may exhibit endogenous differentiation in terms of
marketing systems, even though the ﬁrms are ex-ante symmetric. No marketing system can be said
to strictly dominate the other, in the sense that it will not always be used by both ﬁrms under every
circumstances.
82 A Shareware monopoly
2.1 The Model
Consider a single ﬁrm developing a software. Customers have to buy or, when that is possible, try
the software before knowing its value. That value is not known to the ﬁrm, and is not the same
to each customer. The ﬁrm plays a two stage game. In a ﬁrst stage, the ﬁrm chooses a marketing
method for its product, either the shareware marketing system or the shelfware marketing system. A
ﬁrm that chooses the shareware marketing system will develop at no cost a new product (the “light
version”) that will reveal to customers the value of its product (the “full version”). It can decide that
the customer must buy the light version before the full version, or that customers can buy the full
version directly without having bought the light version before. A ﬁrm that chooses the shelfware
marketing system has nothing to do. In a second stage, the ﬁrm chooses its price. If it chose the
shareware marketing system, it sets a price w on the light version and a price p on the full version.
The choice of p and w is made at the same time. If it chose the shelfware marketing system, it sets
a price P on its product (“shelfware”). There is a mass 1 of undifferentiated customers. Customers
learn the ﬁrm’s choice of marketing system choice and its price(s). All customers have the same a-
priori on the product: The customers’ prior on the value of the product follows a simple distribution
function : There are a-priori two possible values for the product, v with probability π and v with
probability 1−π. Denote Ev = πv +(1−π)v. If the ﬁrm chose the shareware marketing system,
the customers buy the light version at price w, and learn the value v ∈ (v,v) of the full version.
They incur no set-up cost in so doing but the value of the light version is zero. They can then choose
to buy the full version at price p, incur set-up cost ϕ and get value v from the product. If the ﬁrm
chose the shelfware marketing system, customers pay P, incur set-up cost ϕ and then learn and
obtain value v from the product. Set-up costs ϕ are known and identical for all customers.
Assumption 1 Ev − ϕ > 0
The graph below illustrates the chronology of the trying and buying process depending on the
ﬁrm’s marketing system:
(Graph 1 p. 10)
2.2 Preliminary analysis and outline
When the ﬁrm chooses a shelfware marketing system, the customer’s expected value for the product
is Ev − ϕ − P, while if the ﬁrm chooses a shareware marketing system, the customer will buy the
light version at price w, and then, knowing the value of the product, decide whether to spend p and
incur set-up costs ϕ on the full version.
9Figure 1: The trying and buying process.
In the following discussion of a shareware monopoly, there are two cases: In one case the
customer must buy the light version before the full version; the ﬁrm can prevent the customer
from buying its product without having tried it. In the other case, the customers are free to decide
whether to buy the full version directly or buy the light version before buying the full version. That
distinction reﬂects different assumptions about the ability of the ﬁrm to maintain strict control on
the distribution of the try-out version of its product. It cannot maintain control when for example
the available technology makes it unaffordable to require from customers that they register the light
version, or when the ﬁrm out-sources the distribution of the try-out version to a ﬁrm like ZdNet,
which aggregates shareware offerings on a single marketplace, reaching many more customers than
individual ﬁrms could.
One remark is in order: the ﬁrm decides ﬁrst whether to use a shareware or a shelfware mar-
keting system, and then sets its prices, (P) if a shelfware marketing system is chosen, (w,p) if a
shareware marketing system is chosen. This is in fact equivalent to another modeling option that
would consist in setting prices (P,p,w) where P would be the price of the software if it is bought
without trying, and p its price if w was paid before and the product tried. The ﬁrm does indeed have
the same a-priori on all customers, so that it cannot segregate between those who will want to try
before buying and those who buy directly. All customers face the same (P,p,w) triplet and take
the same decisions. In case the ﬁrm can make sure a customer who tried the product will pay p to
buy the full version, the customer must choose to either pay (P) or (w,p). In case the ﬁrm cannot
monitor customers and they are free to buy the full product at price p or P, then the customer is
faced with the choice to pay (P) or (w,min(p,P)). Both options will be considered. The fact that
both modeling options are equivalent will translate into the competitive case as long as the ﬁrms
are not able to segregate between customers who tried or bought the other company’s software and
10those who didn’t.
2.3 A discriminatory monopolist
Suppose the monopolist is able to discriminate, when selling the software, between a customer who
tried his product and one who did not. He can therefore prevent a customer who did not buy the
light version from buying the full version. The monopoly will set up a SMS if, by letting customer
try the product through the light version, he increases its expected willingness to pay for the full
product by an amount sufﬁcient to make up for the potential loss of sale from customers deciding
not to buy the product after having learned its value. This may occur if there is some probability
that the value of the product does not cover the set-up cost ϕ. Marketing this product as a shareware
then allows the customer to avoid spending set-up costs in cases where the value of the software is
too low to make this expense worthwhile. The following proposition draws from this intuition:
Proposition 1 A discriminatory monopolist will use a SMS if an only if v − ϕ ≤ 0. He will set
p ∈ [v − ϕ,v − ϕ] and πp + w = π(v − ϕ). If v − ϕ ≥ 0, he will sell his software as a shelfware
and set P = Ev − ϕ.
Proof. If a SMS is used, and p ≤ v − ϕ, then, the shareware is always bought and the SMS
is equivalent to a shelfware marketing system. If p ≥ v − ϕ, then, it is never bought. Now, if
p ∈ [v −ϕ,v −ϕ], the customer’s expected value for the software is π(v −ϕ)−πp−w so that the
ﬁrm will set πp + w = π(v − ϕ) so as extract all the surplus of the customer.
If a shelfware marketing system is used, the ﬁrm sets P = Ev − ϕ which is the expected value
of the software.
A SMS will thus be used if π(v − ϕ) ≥ Ev − ϕ, or v − ϕ ≤ 0.
2.4 A non-discriminatory monopolist
A monopolist may ﬁnd it technically impossible or economically unviable to discriminate between
customers who tried his product beforehand and those who did not. Alternatively, proposing dif-
ferent prices to people who tried the product and those who didn’t may be illegal. The non-
discriminating monopoly, when setting up a SMS, must therefore set the price of its product so
as to get customers to naturally try its product before buying.
Proposition 2 A non-discriminating monopolist will use a SMS if an only if v −ϕ ≤ 0. He will set
p ∈ [Ev −ϕ,v −ϕ] and πp+w = π(v −ϕ). If v −ϕ ≥ 0, he will sell his software as a shelfware
and set P = Ev − ϕ.
Proof. p must be set such that the customer, when faced with a SMS, prefers to try the software
before buying it, instead of just buying it directly:
Ev − ϕ − p ≤ π(v − ϕ − p) − w
11Since πp + w = π(v − ϕ) so as to extract all the surplus, then, this condition translates in
p ≥ Ev − ϕ
Then buying the shareware without trying it is not a valuable alternative for customers. Com-
paring proﬁts in the SMS case and when a shelfware marketing system is used, the same conditions
apply for the use of a SMS than in the case of a discriminating monopoly.
2.5 Continuum of valuations
The very simple value distribution of the previous part does not allow to predict the value of p and
w, but only a range for them. With a more general continuous distribution of values, there comes a
difference between the case where customers’ ex-ante expectations on the value of the good follow
a continuous distribution function ex-ante and they receive either v or v ex-post, and the case where
customers all
have the same expectation on the value of the good ex-ante, but their valuation follow a contin-
uous distribution function ex-post.
2.5.1 Uncertainty over the prior of customers
Customers have different a-priori on the product, which is expressed via an a priori probability
π that the product has value v, and 1 − π that it has value v. The a-priori π is distributed in the
population according to the density function f(π) and π takes its values over [π,π] ⊂ [0,1]. The
expectations of customers are rational; a customer who has a-priori π will get value v from the good
with probability π.
The ﬁrm will set w = 0 so as to maximize the number of people trying its product.
Proposition 3 When customers have different a-priori valuations for the product, the monopoly
that uses a SMS - whether he can discriminate between customers or not - will set w = 0 and
p = v − ϕ.
A SMS will be chosen iif
Eπ(v − ϕ) ≥ max
π [(1 − F(π))(πv + (1 − π)v − ϕ)]
Proof. If the ﬁrm chooses a shelfware marketing system, then, for a given price P, it sells to all
customers who have an a-priori π s.t. πv + (1 − π)v − ϕ ≥ P. There is a proportion 1 − F(π) of
such customers. Proﬁt is therefore (1−F(π))(πv +(1−π)v −ϕ) when P = πv +(1−π)v −ϕ.
The ﬁrm will choose π such as to maximize this expression.
If the ﬁrm chooses a SMS, any w > 0 results in some customers not trying the product. Setting
w = 0 ensures all customers try the product, which increases the proﬁt of the ﬁrm, since each
12customer has a probability π > 0 of ﬁnding the product has value v - and therefore buy it if
p ≤ v − ϕ. p will be set at v − ϕ, and when w = 0, the question of discrimination does not enter
into account, since no customer will want to buy the product directly without trying it. The proﬁt of
the ﬁrm will be Eπ(v − ϕ), or the average probability that the product is bought after having been
tried, times the price of the shareware.
2.5.2 Uncertainty over the ex-post value of the good
Suppose now that ex-ante, all customers are alike. They all have the same a-priori f on the value v
of the product. f is the density function of the cumulative distribution function F. Each customer’s
ex-post value is independent from that gotten by another one, and the overall distribution of values
gotten by the customers is distributed according to f.
A discriminatory monopoly Suppose the monopolist can discriminate between the consumers
who tried the product and those who did not, and can prevent those last ones from buying the
product.
Proposition 4 When customers have different a-posteriori valuations for the product, the discrim-
inating monopoly will choose a SMS if and only if the support of the consumer’s prior on the net
value v − ϕ of the software includes negative values, or Pr{v − ϕ < 0} > 0
The monopolist will set p = 0 (or marginal cost) and w = E{max[v − ϕ,0]}
Proof. Appendix A
The monopolist sets p at its marginal cost, and w so as to extract the surplus from the consumer.
Proﬁt will be




Indeed, all customers try the product at that price if p = 0, as they know
theywillnotendeartolearnhowtousetheproductifitsvaluedoesn’tcoveritsset-upcosts. The
monopoly extracts the customers’ expected surplus in the try-out period and then sells his product
at its marginal cost, which maximizes total surplus from trade. The result is quite intuitive: getting
a negative net value from the product is an event which probability can be reduced by setting up a
SMS. This result is similar to Crémer (1984) where ﬁrms price at marginal cost in a second period
after consumers learned their taste in a ﬁrst period of buying. The price of the light version is high
while going over to the full version is free. This result runs counter to the pricing policy of most
shareware but may however be applied in other similar settings: many products are offered with
a guarantee, after-sale service and support, which can be seen as products in their own right. The
“physical” good can be seen as a “light version”, while support, after-sale service and guarantee
can be seen as a “full version” that comes free when needed.
13A non-discriminatory monopoly Suppose now that the monopolist cannot prevent the customers
from buying the product without trying it. If the SMS is chosen, the customer can then choose to
pay w before buying, or buy directly at p. The non-discriminatory monopoly has two marketing
options: either sell his product to all customers as a shelfware at price P = Ev−ϕ, and make proﬁt
π0 = Ev −ϕ, or sell it as a shareware at a price p ≤ Ev −ϕ with w = E{max[p−v +ϕ,0]} and
make proﬁt π1 = p −
R p+ϕ
v (v − ϕ)f(v)dv.
Selling the shareware at a price p > Ev − ϕ does of course prevent the customer from buying
the shareware without trying it, but p = Ev − ϕ achieves the same purpose without incurring the
same loss of efﬁciency in extracting the surplus from the consumer; the lower is p, the more there
are customers who buy after having tried, and the higher is the total welfare that the shareware can
appropriate. This is why p ≤ Ev − ϕ.
Proposition 5 When customers have different a-posteriori valuations for the product and the ﬁrm
cannot discriminate between customers, the SMS is preferred to the shelfware marketing method iif
E(v|v ≤ E(v)) ≤ ϕ as long as the a-posteriori value distribution f is a logconcave distribution
function
p will be equal to Ev − ϕ and w will be more than 0.
Proof. Appendix B
The condition for using the SMS when discrimination is not possible is more stringent than the
condition for using a shareware marketing system when discrimination is possible. In that last case,
the condition could translate as ϕ ≥ v, while now the condition is that ϕ ≥ E(v|v ≤ E(v)) ≥ v.
When the ﬁrm is able to discriminate, it will use a SMS more frequently than if it is not able to do
so. Since the price p is positive, there will always be less customers buying the shareware when no
discrimination is possible than when it is possible. Therefore, total welfare is less when there is no
discrimination.
Example f is an uniform distribution over [v,v] When discrimination is not possible, a SMS is
used when
v+3v
4 ≤ ϕ ≤
3v+v
4 . The product cannot be sold for ϕ ≥
3v+v
4 .If the ﬁrm is able to
discriminate, then a SMS is used for all v ≤ ϕ ≤ v. The graph below compares proﬁts of the ﬁrm
as a function of ϕ, when using discriminatory power (π∗) and without using it (max(π0,π1)). The
case with no discrimination is a lower envelope to the case with discrimination. This last one is
therefore always more efﬁcient.
(Graph 2 p. 15)
The pricing choice of a ﬁrm is dependent on the prior of the customers about the value of its
product, and on the ﬁrm’s ability to discriminate between those who try the product, and those who
do not. Since the try-out version of a shareware is usually free, while its price is higher than that
of a comparable software, the assumptions of the part 2.5.1 of this paper seem to be the ones that
14Figure 2: Monopoly shareware proﬁts.
are veriﬁed on the software market: the customers’ priors vary, while the value of the product is
perceived as binary, either useful or useless.
3 Competition between marketing systems
3.1 The model
Two ﬁrms each developed a software. The two software are indistinguishable ex-ante, and cus-
tomers have to buy or try them before knowing what is their value. That value is not known to
the ﬁrm, and is not the same to each customer. Firms play a two stage game. In a ﬁrst stage,
ﬁrms independently choose a marketing method for their product, either the shareware marketing
system or the shelfware marketing system. A ﬁrm that chooses the shareware marketing system
will develop a new product at no cost (the “light version”), which if bought reveals to customers
the value of its product (the “full version”). In order to simplify the analysis, assume that the ﬁrm
is able to require customers to try its product before buying (Corollary 1 will show the results of
this part can be extended to the case where it is not able.) This corresponds to the “discrimination
case” of the previous part. A ﬁrm that chooses the shelfware marketing system has nothing to do.
In a second stage, ﬁrms choose their prices, knowing what choice the other ﬁrm made. A ﬁrm that
chose the shareware marketing system has to set a price w on the light version and a price p on the
full version. A ﬁrm that chose the shelfware marketing system sets a price P on its product (the
“shelfware”). The choice of prices is made at the same time by both ﬁrms. There is a mass 1 of
undifferentiated customers. Customers learn the choice of systems by both ﬁrms and their prices.
All customers have the same a-priori on both products. The customers’ prior on the value of the
15products follows a simple distribution function: There are two possible a-priori values for the prod-
uct, v with probability π and v with probability 1 − π. For each products, each customer’s ex-post
value is independent from that gotten by another one, and this value is independent of the value he
gets from the other product. A customer who bought the two products (full version and shelfware)
obtains an utility equal to the maximum of the two ex-post values. In other words, using the two
products at the same time does not provide any additional utility.
As a matter of example, look at the case where one ﬁrm chose the shareware marketing system
and the other the shelfware marketing system. In a ﬁrst stage, the customer decides which of the
product to choose ﬁrst: the light version of the shareware or the shelfware. If the customer chooses
the light version, he pays w, and learns the value of the full version. If he chooses the shelfware, he
pays P, incurs set-up cost ϕ and learns its value.
In a second stage:
• If the light version of the shareware was bought in the ﬁrst stage, the customer can decide to
buy the full version of the shareware or to buy the shelfware. If he buys the full version in the
second stage he pays p and incurs set up cost ϕ. If he buys the shelfware, he pays P, incurs
set-up cost ϕ and learns its value.
• If the shelfware was bought in the ﬁrst stage, the customer can try the light version, pay w,
and learn the value of the full version, or he can stay with the shelfware. Trying the shareware
does not allow you to recover any set-up costs in buying the other software. This assumption
reﬂects the extreme point of view that the try-out version of the shareware only allows you
to evaluate its quality, without allowing you to learn how that kind of software works. You
cannot ﬁt it to your needs and it does not necessitate any changes in your system that may
also be useful when using another software. The try-out version of the shareware may be a
read-only version of the product, that allows you to see what kind of documents you could
create with the full version, but does not allow you to create such documents. (Realplayer by
RealNetworks). On the other hand, the shelfware is designed in a way that forces you to incur
those set-up costs ϕ before being able to use it, but those costs are partly recoverable in using
another product of the same family. The shelfware will be designed in a way that makes the
full ϕ expense necessary: since the shelfware chose this marketing system, it will design its
product so that buying it only to learn its value without actually installing it properly will be
prohibitively costly.
In a third stage, if both the light version and the shelfware were bought and the customer decides
to buy the full version of the shareware, his set up cost is ψ < ϕ because he already incurred setup
cost of ϕ for the shelfware. ψ is lower than ϕ because software are usually built on open standards
and switching costs consist mainly of establishing a new commercial relationship with the software
developer (query, download, register, pay) and setting the parameters of the software. The customer
avoids “higher levels” of learning. For example, if you learnt the terminology of mail reading
16Figure 3: The buying process when a shareware and a shelfware compete.
systems with Outlook, then it will be easy to use Eudora. Set-up costs ϕ and ψ are known and
identical for all customers.
All this is summarized in the following diagram :
(Graph 3 p. 17)
This graph shows what set-up costs and prices the customer faces according to his decision
process. Origin is the initial stage, Shelf is the stage after having chosen the shelfware ﬁrst,
ShelfShare is the stage where the shareware was tried after the shelfware was bought, etc... Sim-
ilar processes of choice can be detailed when both ﬁrms chose a shareware marketing system or
both chose a shelfware marketing system. As mentioned, ex-ante, all products look identical to
each customers, and all customers are alike.
Assumption 2 v ≤ ϕ − ψ ≤ v.
3.2 Shelfware competition
The two ﬁrms chose a shelfware marketing system. For a given price, a shelfware prefers being
bought ﬁrst than second, because he will get more clients this way. A customer will choose the
lower priced shelfware ﬁrst, so that there is a tendency for a shelfware to undercut its competitor’s.
However, since even if a shelfware was not chosen ﬁrst, it can still be chosen second at a positive
price, prices will not be led to 0 as in Bertrand competition.
Notation 1 ∆ = v − v and g = π∆ − ψ.
17Figure 4: The convergence to a Bertrand equilibrium.
g = π∆ − ψ is the surplus value that can be gained from buying the second shelfware after
havingboughtaﬁrstoneandfounditsvaluetobev.Thisisbecausetheexpectedvalueofthesecond
tried is Ev−ψ and it will be bought only if Ev−ψ−p ≥ v, v being the alternative. If a ﬁrst ﬁrm sets
a low price and the other a high price, the ﬁrst ﬁrm will sell ﬁrst, but if the customer ﬁnds it to be of
value v, the other ﬁrm, as long as its price is less than g, will be chosen second. In an hypothetical
dynamic setting, the ﬁrst ﬁrm is then tempted to raise its price up to the level of the other one. If the
other ﬁrm then lowers its price below the ﬁrst one’s price, it will be chosen ﬁrst, which increases its
proﬁts. This shows there is no pure strategy equilibrium. A symmetric mixed strategy equilibrium
must therefore be constructed. This strategy must guarantee expected payoff of at least (1 − π)g
because this payoff is always attainable by setting p = g. Firms thus choose prices according to a
cumulative distribution function H(.) such that p(1 − H(p)) + (1 − π)pH(p) = (1 − π)g. The
term on the left is the expected payoff of the competitor. The strategy followed must guarantee him
a payoff of (1 − π)g so that he is willing to himself follow that same mixed strategy.
Proposition 6 Thereisnopurestrategyequilibriumofapricinggamebetweencompetingshelfware.
There exists a symmetric mixed strategy equilibrium which guarantees proﬁts of (1 − π)g for each
ﬁrms.
Proof. Appendix C
(Graph 4 p. 18)
The graph above shows how this result is a generalization of a Bertrand equilibrium to cases
where the value of the product is not known before buying and customers can switch between
18products. The arrows show the direction of the effect of an increase in π on the price distribution
function H(.). At the limit, when π = 1, ﬁrms set price p = 0 with probability 1. This corresponds
to a Bertrand equilibrium.
3.3 Shareware vs Shelfware competition
One ﬁrm is a shelfware, which has to choose a price P, the other is a shareware, with two choice
variables, the price w for the light version and the price p for the full version. When people buy
the shelfware, they are guaranteed at least value v from the shelfware, but they incur learning costs
ϕ. When they buy the light version of the shareware, they get no value from it, but do not need
to incur set up costs. When people buy the shelfware ﬁrst, there are two contradictory effects
on the subsequent perceived value of the shareware: the ﬁrst one is that the set up cost of the
shareware will be lowered to ψ, the second one is that consumers have at least a v option to trying
the shareware. When people try the shareware ﬁrst, there are the same kind of contradictory effect
on the subsequent perceived value of the shelfware, except that the set up cost ϕ is high for both
software, and the option value is lower at max[v − ϕ − p,0]. A balance must be struck between
those effects. The ﬁrst part of this section deﬁnes a (π,ψ) domain where an unique equilibrium in
pure strategies (“PSE”) exists. The second part shows that there exists a mixed strategy equilibrium
(“MSE”) for (π,ψ) outside the PSE domain.
Preliminary remark Any couple (w,p) with w > 0 and p > 0 is weakly dominated by a couple
(w0,p0) with w0 = 0 and πp0 = πp + w. Indeed, since ψ > 0, if p > 0, the customer will never
buy the shareware if vShare = v – If he bought the shelfware before, he is better off using it even
if its value is low rather than incur expense ψ > 0. If he didn’t buy it before, he prefers buying
the shelfware now, which has positive expectation of utility, rather than learning how to use the
shareware, which would provides utility of v − ϕ, a negative number by assumption 2. Because
w > 0, the customer will try the shareware only if he is sure to buy it when vShare = v. Therefore,
w > 0 and p > 0 means that the decision of the customer to test the shareware is equivalent
to a decision to buy it if vShare = v. πp + w is therefore the only parameter that enters in the
decision of the customer when looking at the couple of prices (w,p). This couple (w,p) is weakly
dominated by (w0,p0), because πp0+w0 = πp+w (same proﬁt) and w > w0, which means there are
potentially more customers who try the shareware under the couple (w0,p0) than under the couple
(w,p). This concept of weak dominance is repeatedly used to simplify the exposition of the proofs
of the following lemmas and propositions.
3.3.1 Pure strategy equilibrium in shareware vs. shelfware competition
The graph below outlines the customer’s choice process. This graph shows the ﬁnal payoffs of a
customer according to his pattern of choice and the results of his product samplings.
(Graph 5 p. 20)
19Figure 5: The customer’s payoff, depending on his strategy and sampling results.
Successive lemmas will allow a simpliﬁcation of this graph. Proposition 4 gives the conditions
that ensure a PSE of the game of shareware vs. shelfware competition exists. It is then shown that
under those conditions, it is unique.
From the shelfware vs. shelfware competition analysis, a ﬁrm can always choose to be chosen
second at a positive price if the other is chosen ﬁrst. The same reasoning can be applied here:
both ﬁrms will make positive proﬁts in a pure strategy equilibrium. Neither the shareware nor the
shelfware can eliminate the other ﬁrm by choosing one or the other pricing system.
Lemma 1 In any pure strategy equilibrium, both ﬁrms sell with positive probability.
Proof. Appendix D.1
DenoteU(Shelf)theconsumer’sexpectedutilityfrombuyingtheshelfwareﬁrst, andU(Share)
theconsumer’sexpectedutilityfromtryingthesharewareﬁrst. SupposethatU(Shelf) < U(Share).
Then the shareware will increase its prices until U(Shelf) = U(Share) so as to make higher prof-
its. Now, suppose U(Share) = U(Shelf). Then the shareware can lower its price P by ε so as
to be bought ﬁrst and make proﬁts of P − ε – instead of 1
2(1 + (1 − π))P when the customer
was indifferent between choosing one of the product ﬁrst or second – unless when U(Share) =
U(Shelf), the shelfware is bought with probability 1. Therefore, in any pure equilibrium, either
U(Shelf) > U(Share) or U(Shelf) = U(Share) and the shelfware is bought with probability
1. This means that, while from a welfare point of view, it is better that the shareware be tried ﬁrst,
this cannot be the case in a pure strategy equilibrium: you will ﬁrst buy the shelfware and then try
the shareware.
20Lemma 2 There are no pure strategy equilibria where the shelfware is bought with probability less
than 1.
Proof. Appendix D.2.
Contrary to what could be expected, a ﬁrm that lets consumers try its product does not subsidize
their trying. This is because it is not necessary to lower w below 0 as it would only lower proﬁts
without gaining customers.
Lemma 3 There are no pure strategy equilibrium with w < 0.
Proof. Appendix D.3.
The proposition below builds on the previous lemmas. From those lemmas, the search is re-
stricted to branches of graph 5 where the shelfware is bought with probability 1, w ≥ 0 , and both
products are sold. There remains only to study the optimal choice of the shareware when that type
of choice pattern is followed, and determine under what conditions the shareware will not deviate,
so that a pure equilibrium exists.
Some intuitions: v is the minimum alternative to trying the shareware when the shelfware has
been bought, and ϕ − ψ is the difference between the set up costs ψ for the shareware when it
is bought after the shelfware, and the set up cost ϕ for the shareware when it is bought ﬁrst. As
v ≤ ϕ−ψ by assumption 2, and if π is relatively low, the shareware accepts being tried second by a
proportion 1−π of customers – the people who got value v from the shelfware. v is sufﬁciently low
to make the shelfware look like a bad alternative compared to buying the shareware when the value
of the shareware is high, while ϕ−ψ – the reduction in shareware set-up costs – is high enough for
the shareware to prefer being bought after the shelfware.
Proposition 7 There exists a pure strategy equilibrium iff π ≤
q
ϕ−v−ψ
∆−ψ . The shelfware sells
with probability one while the shareware is tried by the consumers who were disappointed by the
shelfware.
w is positive and p ∈ [−ψ,∆ − ψ], while πp + w = π(∆ − ψ) and P = Ev − ϕ
The shareware makes proﬁt of VShare = (1 − π)π(∆ − ψ) while the shelfware makes proﬁt of
VShelf = Ev − ϕ.
This PSE is the unique PSE of the competition game.
Proof. Appendix D.4.
Despite competition, all welfare goes to the ﬁrms. The shelfware is bought ﬁrst with probability
one if w > 0, while if w = 0, the consumer is indifferent between buying the shelfware ﬁrst, or
trying the shareware ﬁrst and then buying the shelfware. The shareware is tried with probability
1−π but is bought only with probability π(1−π), when its value is found to be high and the value
21of the shelfware is found to be low. Given that π ≤
q
ϕ−v−ψ
∆−ψ , proﬁt of the shareware is strictly
higher than the shelfware’s proﬁt; the shareware has two pricing instruments, compared with only
one for the shelfware, and this allows it to make higher proﬁts in equilibrium than the shelfware.
The shareware will have a lower market share than the shelfware, but will sell only to customers
who think it has a high value, while the shelfware is sold to everybody. Customers who own a
shareware will therefore be satisﬁed by it, while there will be a proportion (1 − π)2 of people who
use the shelfware that will be dissatisﬁed with it, but will keep using it because they also found the
shareware to be of low value. The shelfware has no incentive to choose a mixed strategy over its
price P, as P = Ev − ϕ is the highest price it can ask for any possible choice of prices by the
shareware. Given that P = Ev − ϕ, the shareware cannot get higher proﬁts than what it makes
under this pure equilibrium; choosing a mixed strategy would make sense only if that resulted in
the shareware before chosen ﬁrst in some instances, but in the domain where the PSE holds, being
chosen ﬁrst results in less proﬁts for the shareware, so that it has no incentive to choose a mixed
strategy over prices.
Suppose now that the shareware cannot require its customers to buy the try-out version of the
shareware before buying the full version.
Corollary 1 The results of proposition 7 remain valid when the shareware cannot require people
to try its product before buying.
Proof. The shareware can set w = 0 and p = ∆ − ψ. Then, customers are at least better of
trying the shareware before buying it, since trying is free and it may result in not having to pay
p > 0.
Suppose that a customer could buy the shelfware, choose to incur cost C to learn its value, and
then install it at cost ϕ.
Corollary 2 The results of proposition 7 remain valid when C, the cost of learning the value of the
shelfware, is more than (1 − π)(ϕ − v − π(ϕ − ψ))
Proof. The expected utility for the customer when conforming to the equilibrium strategy is
Ev − ϕ − P + (1 − π)π(v − p − ψ) − w while if he chooses to incur cost C for testing the
shelfware to know its value before deciding to invest ϕ in set up costs, then his expected utility
is π(v − ϕ) − P + (1 − π)π(v − p − ϕ) − w − C. The former is higher than the later if C ≥
(1 − π)(ϕ − v − π(ϕ − ψ))
Thecostoflearningthevalueoftheshelfwaredoesnotneedtobehighforthecustomertoprefer
to incur full set up costs directly. If C is sufﬁciently high, the customer will not treat the shelfware
like he would treat the try-out version of a shareware; a quick review of the characteristics of the
shelfware before installing it increases total set-up costs by too much for this review to be made.
223.3.2 Mixed strategy equilibrium in shareware vs. shelfware competition
A pure strategy equilibrium in shelfware vs shareware competition was found, and it has some
counter intuitive characteristics. A mixed strategy equilibrium of this game is difﬁcult to ﬁnd be-
cause of the asymmetric nature of the game played. The MSE is found by assuming that the mixed
strategy equilibrium will exhibit some properties of the pure equilibrium strategy, and by building
from those premises to ﬁnd a MSE that veriﬁes those properties. The important properties of the
PSE that will simplify the search for a MSE are that when the shareware is tried, it is bought only
if its quality is high, and for any realization of p, P and w, any one of the product is bought with
a positive probability. In other terms, ∀[p,P] ∈ [Support of p] × [Support of P], 0 < pr[shelfware
sells] and 0 < pr[shareware sells]. Under those conditions, what matters for the competition game
is the comparison of πp + w with P. For further simpliﬁcation, and without loss of generality (See
the preliminary remark to 3.3.1), assume w = 0 and p ∈ [0,∆−ψ], so that the only choice variable
of the shareware is p.






ψ ≥ π ≥
q
ϕ−v−ψ
∆−ψ , the expected payoff of the shelfware is VShelf = π(1 − π)(∆ −
ψ) − (1 − π)ψ while the expected payoff of the shareware is VShare = π(1 − π)(∆ − ψ).
For π ≥
ϕ−v−ψ
ψ , the expected payoff of the shelfware is VShelf = (1 − π)(Ev − ϕ) while the
expected payoff of the shareware is VShare = (1 − π)(Ev − ϕ) + (1 − π)ψ.
Proof. Appendix E
The three different domains π ≤
q
ϕ−v−ψ





ψ ] and π ≥
ϕ−v−ψ
ψ are
mutually exclusive because Ev − ϕ ≥ 0. There is a continuity of the payoffs on the whole (π,ψ)
domain (Figure 7)
The following graph shows the domains of deﬁnition of the equilibria,
(Graph 6 p. 24)
while this graph shows the payoffs of the shareware and the shelfware when ψ varies.
(Graph 7 p. 24)
When ψ reaches a certain level, its increase actually increases the payoffs of the shareware.
This is because while for ψ low, the shareware keeps on putting some probability on setting its
price high (p = ∆ − ψ) so as to be chosen second, that strategy is not anymore proﬁtable when ψ
becomes high. The shareware then prefers trying to be chosen ﬁrst, and this strategy becomes more
credible vis-a-vis the shelfware when ψ increases; the shelfware chooses a low price with higher
probability.
23Figure 6: The payoffs of competing shareware and shelfware when ψ and π vary.
Figure 7: The payoffs of competing shareware and shelfware when ψ varies.
24The shelfware is in a worse competitive position in a mixed strategy equilibrium than in a
pure equilibrium as it will not always be chosen ﬁrst. This is apparent from the fact that the pure
equilibrium corresponds to the best case scenario for the shelfware: the shelfware is always bought
at its monopoly price. It was however not straightforward that the shareware would be better off in
a MSE than in a PSE: while in a PSE it is indeed bought with the lowest possible probability, this is
at the highest possible price. It is only for π high that the shareware stops putting some probability
to set p at its highest possible level ∆ − ψ, and can make higher proﬁts than (1 − π)π(∆ − ψ).
This mixed strategy equilibrium does not anymore allow the ﬁrms to jointly extract all surplus
from the market, but the shareware still is able to make strictly higher proﬁts than the shelfware. In
this mixed strategy equilibrium, when P increases, and depending on the realization of πp+w, the
probability for the shelfware to be bought may be lowered from 1 to 1 − π, and the probability for
the shareware to be bought may increase from π(1 − π) to π. Depending on πp + w and P, what
varies is the probability to try the shareware, 1 or 1−π, but for any realization of p, P and w, there
is a positive probability that the shareware or the shelfware will be bought. This MSE therefore
veriﬁes the desirable properties that were assumed to hold when trying to ﬁnd it. It was not possible
to ﬁnd other types of MSE where there would be a positive probability that none of the product is
bought, or one of the products is not bought. That does not mean the MSE presented here is the
unique one.
3.4 Shareware competition
Both ﬁrms chose a SMS. Like in shelfware competition, ﬁrms’ marketing system are the same, so
that no pure equilibrium will be found. However, after having tried one shareware, the option is 0
instead of v, since you do not own the product. On the other hand, you will have to incur expense
ϕ only if you decide to buy one of the product. Therefore, the maximum value that a shareware can
extract from the consumer if it is chosen second is π(v − ϕ), instead of g = π∆ − ψ in shelfware
competition. The proposition below shows there exists a mixed strategy equilibrium that guarantees
to each shareware at least the proﬁt it could make if it was always chosen second.
Proposition 9 There is no pure strategy equilibrium when two shareware compete. There exists a
mixed strategy that guarantees expected payoff of (1 − π)π(v − ϕ) for both ﬁrms.
Proof. Appendix F.
The proof is very similar to the one made in the “shelfware competition” section. πp+w is the
expected price of the shareware, and it plays exactly the same role as P in shelfware competition.
The proof also borrows from the proof of the existence of a MSE in shareware vs. shelfware
competition, as it builds on the intuition that a MSE with some desirable characteristics exists, and
then shows that a MSE can be found which exhibits those characteristics.
25Figure 8: The payoffs of competing software depending on their pricing systems’ choice.
4 Competing ﬁrms’ choice of marketing systems
Knowing the expected proﬁts of ﬁrms under the different pricing choice they and their competitor
make, the equilibrium chosen will depend on the relationship between their payoffs. Firm’s payoffs
can be represented in a 2 × 2 game matrix according to the choice of pricing systems. The matrix
below represents the case where there is a pure equilibrium in shareware vs. shelfware competition.
(Graph 8 p. 26)
The following proposition indicates what kind of pricing systems will coexist for various levels





Proposition 10 When π ≤
q
ϕ−v−ψ
∆−ψ and π low, ﬁrms both choose a SMS with probability 1, while
for π high, ﬁrms will choose a SMS with probability α1 < 1.
For
ϕ−v−ψ
ψ ≥ π ≥
q
ϕ−v−ψ
∆−ψ , ﬁrms will choose a SMS with probability α2 < α1
and for π ≥
ϕ−v−ψ
ψ , ﬁrms choose a SMS.
Proof. Appendix G.
The graph below shows a generic case, and indicates which types of competition equilibrium
will emerge depending on the (π,ψ) characteristics of the products sold.
(Graph 9 p. 27)
26Figure 9: The software’s equilibrium choices of pricing strategies.
In most cases, a SMS will be chosen when there is competition. There are however cases where
ﬁrms may end up choosing different marketing systems. Equilibrium conﬁgurations exhibits en-
dogenous differentiation between the ﬁrms. Unlike in the paper by Krishna and Winston (2000),
that differentiation is not mediated through a choice of different levels of quality, but through a
choice of different marketing systems. Firms get a high beneﬁt from differentiation, one ﬁrm serv-
ing customers who were disappointed with the other, while the other sells as a “generalist”. The
beneﬁts of such differentiation are high enough that a ﬁrm may settle for the “inferior” shelfware
marketing system instead of adopting a SMS that would put it into a more direct competition with
the other ﬁrm.
From a welfare point of view, the product selection process in shareware vs shelfware compe-
tition is suboptimal. Indeed, it is possible that the shareware be bought only as a second choice in
equilibrium, while from a social welfare point of view, having it tried ﬁrst, and bought whenever its
value is high is always more efﬁcient. The total welfare is indeed higher in that case:
π(v − ϕ) + (1 − π)(Ev − ϕ) ≥ Ev − ϕ + (1 − π)π(∆ − ψ)
It was quite straightforward from the outset that a SMS was more efﬁcient from a welfare point
of view than a shelfware pricing system. This is because under a SMS customers incur set-up costs
only when it is efﬁcient to do so. However, it is now possible to discuss how much of that welfare
goes to the customers and the ﬁrms, depending on the equilibrium that surfaces.
Proposition 11 The higher the probability that ﬁrms use a SMS, the higher is the total welfare.
Consumers beneﬁt from the SMS only if both ﬁrms adopt it.
27Figure 10: The welfare results of software ﬁrms’ pricing strategies.
Proof. Appendix H
The worst situation for the consumers is when shareware vs shelfware competition occurs in the
domain where a pure equilibrium exists (π ≤
q
ϕ−v−ψ
∆−ψ ) and ﬁrms choose a SMS with probability
1 (‘π low’). Firms are then able to extract all surplus from the customer by differentiating based
on pricing systems. Consumer welfare is highest when there is shareware competition. The SMS
always enhances total welfare, as welfare is higher when there are two shareware than when there
is only one, and it is higher when there is only one than when there is none. The proposition allows
to draw the graph below which outlines the regions where consumer welfare will be highest.
(Graph 10 p. 28)
From this graph, total welfare will be the lowest when ψ is low and π is high, which means that
welfare may be lowered when the probability to get a high value from the product is increased and
it is not very costly to switch from one product to the other. This paradoxical result arises because
when ψ is low, the shelfware marketing system may be used, as it becomes an attractive marketing
system against a SMS. Indeed, the difference in proﬁts the two type of marketing systems allow to
obtain becomes small. Welfare, and more speciﬁcally consumer’s welfare, is then decreased as the
shelfware marketing system is suboptimal from a welfare point of view.
5 Discussion
Interpretation of the price w for the light version w is the utility, positive or negative, of the
try-out version of the shareware. However, it is usually not monetary, and the ﬂow of utility from
28the ﬁrm to the customer may not correspond exactly to the ﬂow of utility from the customer to the
ﬁrm. w is difﬁcult to evaluate empirically: From the point of view of the consumer, w includes the
utility of the try-out product, its set-up cost, and the monetary exchange between the customer and
the ﬁrm. From the point of view of the ﬁrm, w includes the cost of producing and distributing the
try-out product, the monetary exchange between the customer and the ﬁrm, and all revenues that
the ﬁrm can derive from distributing the try-out version. Those revenues can come directly from
advertising that is distributed via the try-out version of the shareware (advertising sponsored version
of Eudora or Opera), or indirectly from network effects: the more there are try-out version around,
the higher is the utility of the full version of the shareware, and thus the higher the price it can be
sold. That effect is quite evident in the case of reader vs. developers’ versions of RealPlayer, a
shelfware that comes in two forms: a version that can only read audio and video ﬁles created using
RealPlayer,
and another that allows people to create those audio and video ﬁles. That last one is all the
more valuable the higher is the number of people who can read those ﬁles. The effect is more subtle
when a ﬁrm wants to promote its own standards. For example, Internet Explorer, a web browser,
has gained such a dominant position that web site designers write their web pages with IE in mind
and the users of other web browser ﬁnd it difﬁcult to read those pages. In order to force Microsoft
and web site developers to care about those compatibility issues, a ﬁrm like Opera switched to a
SMS so as to have more Opera users around. Web site developers then begin to design their web
pages with Opera users in mind, which increases the value of Opera to its users.
Analyzing the role of each components of w did not change the basic insights of the model.
Having a dissymmetry between what customers and ﬁrms get from the shareware did not change
much either. Therefore it does not really matter if w is seen as a monetary exchange between the
ﬁrm and the customer, as the utility of the try-out version of the shareware for the customer, or as the
proﬁt or loss made by the ﬁrm when distributing it. The approach taken in this paper is therefore
justiﬁed; all components of w can be summarized into a single term and treated as a monetary
exchange between the ﬁrm and the consumers.
Some comparative static Suppose ﬁrms committed to a pricing system and have to design their
product in terms of set-up and switching costs, as well as in terms of the distribution function of
the valuations they offer to the customer. In shareware vs. shelfware competition, the proﬁts made
by the shareware is (1 − πshelf)πshare(vshare − vshelf − ψshare) while proﬁts of the shelfware
is Evshelf − ϕshelf. A ﬁrm that has chosen a shelfware pricing system will try to maximize the
value of its product to the average consumer, and minimize set-up costs. A ﬁrm that intends to
use a SMS will not care about the average value of its product, but only about its value to some
customers. It will also try to make it compatible with the shelfware (i.e. “imitate” the shelfware’s
choice of interface, standards and procedures). In a dynamic setting, differentiation between the
two product should occur. Put another way, the choice by ﬁrms of a pricing system will depend
on how ﬁrms think they compare with the other ﬁrms in terms of set up costs, target customers
29and design innovation (which increase ψ). However, cases where ﬁrms are not symmetric are an
extension of this model which was not speciﬁcally studied. The reasoning made here may therefore
be valid only when products remain relatively similar in terms of their f, ϕ and ψ characteristics.
The strategies of Internet providers in France are interesting to study from that point of view :
Firms compete on the basis of their free introductory offers (w), quality of service (π) and choice
of interface, that may be standard (Liberty Surf) or proprietary (AOL). The choice of the interface
determines the level of set-up costs customers have to incur when changing ISP. An user of AOL has
toinstallaproprietarysoftwaretoconnecttotheinternet, butthen, theAOLinterfaceisveryspecial,
and is incompatible with standard ones, since it uses different protocols. It would therefore be
interesting to study if and how the choice of the interface inﬂuences the terms of Internet providers’
offerings.
Variations on the basic model When w is a parameter that is not under the control of the ﬁrm,
or when w is set before p, there is a wider area where a pure equilibrium exists in shareware vs.
shelfware competition. Indeed, the shareware has less strategic freedom, and can therefore more
easily be reduced to being a second choice, like in the pure equilibrium.
The model assumes there is no correlation between the values of competing software. This
means that a customer is not supposed to update his a-priori on one software after having tried the
other. Relaxing this assumption does not change the basic insights of the model, though it may
reduce or augment the value of the second chosen product, and therefore change the expression of
proﬁts. It also introduces a free-riding problem for the shareware, as its try-out version not only
provides information about the value of its own product, but also about the other one’s value. The
competition between Opera and Internet Explorer provides such an example of free-riding. Opera
not only allows a free download of its light version, but uses it to convey information about its rival:
Opera advertises the fact that its software is very light and provides links to Netscape or Internet
Explorer’s download sites, not without warning them that downloading those will be lengthy! This
is a way for Opera to change the a-priori of consumers who try its own product, by making them less
willing to try the other product. Firms may thus want to introduce a negative correlation between
the perceived value of their product and that of the others’. Those issues are discussed in a model
by Meurer and Stahl (1994).
6 Extensions
Two types of customers The model can be extended to a setting with two types of customers who
have different a-priori on the mean value of each product, or different a-priori on the distribution
of their possible values. Firms would try to discriminate between them, by having some try the
products and others not. Courty and Hao (2000) study the problem in the case of a monopoly. This
one will offer a menu of advance payments (p) and partial refunds (w − p) contracts. Bouckaert
and Degryse (2000) model the differences in customers’ a-priori valuations for the software by
30using a parameter t representing the type of the customer on a line with origin one product and end
the other. The utility function then includes a term α(1 − t) for one product and αt for the other.
Two schedules of prices would possibly be offered by one ﬁrm for the same product under its two
versions, a shelfware version with price P, and a shareware version with prices p and w. Setting
p different from P would require setting up a discriminative mechanism between those who tried
the product and those who did not. This could be done through the use of coupons and rebates that
would come with the try-out version of the shareware, as that strategy is frequently used out of the
Internet. Internet ﬁrms usually ﬁnd it easier to install a piece of software on the computer of the
customer who downloaded the try-out version of the shareware, and thus identify them thereafter.
That type of system can take the form of “cookies” that are used to identify returning website
customers. Many shareware vendors hide a marker in the consumer’s computer that forbids them
to use their try-out version beyond its try-out period.
Two periods In a two period settings, a poaching problem emerges: a ﬁrm may be tempted to
discriminate between people who tried the other’s product, and new customers. It would become
possible for the shareware to attract some customers of the software in a second period without
having to reduce its price for those it locked in a ﬁrst period. However, customers would anticipate
this effect. There are examples of such two period pricing strategies : an anti-virus software,
InnoculateIT by Computer Associates International Inc., was long proposed as a shareware with
a free try-out version. That policy was then discontinued while preferential pricing was offered to
users of the try-out version. Fudenberg and Tirole (2000) look at those types of strategies where the
SMS is used as a screening device in a two-stage game.
Intermediated informative advertising A system that is similar to a SMS in some ways, in-
termediated informative advertising as a way to market special-interest goods, is the subject of
another paper, Gaudeul (2002). Newsletters and other “free” information services may be seen
as part of a SMS. Subscribing to a mailing list, or another information service, exposes you to
targeted advertising. Based on personal information that you gave for obtaining the service, the
intermediary will inform you on potentially interesting product. Using such information provides
you with a free beneﬁt and with the option to get informed at a low personal cost on products that
otherwise would require high search costs. This service therefore shares some characteristics of a
SMS. However, ﬁrms that manage information services are usually not the same than those that get
their products advertised. This is why this example requires a new model to study the incentives
of such intermediaries. Some aspects of the activity of Amazon or ZDNet make of them examples
of such intermediated informative advertisers. Amazon lets people read excerpts of some books,
and exploits the feedback from its customers to provide objective recommendations. ZDNet has
developed an efﬁcient web interface that guides customers in their choice of electronic products.
317 Conclusion
The differentiation between ﬁrms that arises in this model is solely the outcome of an equilibrium
in pricing system choices. It is based on the choice of a pricing systems, and is not due to any differ-
ences in the quality of the products both ﬁrms offer, or to the use of different ways to manufacture
the product or service the customer. Even though a mechanism (the SMS) may be deemed supe-
rior to the other by all accounts, as it generates higher proﬁts for the ﬁrm using it and higher total
welfare, an inferior mechanism (the shelfware marketing system) may be preferred in equilibrium.
More interestingly, an inferior mechanism may coexist with a superior one.
When both ﬁrms are shareware, they do not care at all about whether their products are easy to
learn for people who used other products. This may help explain the existence of a wide variety of
shareware that fulﬁll the same needs; developers are freer to innovate. Shelfware, and shareware
that compete with shelfware, will have to worry about making their products easy to learn for
previous users of the other’s product, because those will be more likely to try their own product
if the switch is easy. This may be a reason for the features’ inﬂation and complexity of dominant
shelfware, and the frequent minor changes they incur. It makes it more difﬁcult for a competitor to
keep up and it ensures that consumers will ﬁnd it difﬁcult to switch to the competitor’s product.
Distribution costs were assumed to be low, which allow easy distribution of a light version of
a shareware. In reality, distribution costs for the light version of a software are still signiﬁcant
because of the cost to advertise their availability (See Ilan (2001)).
Customers were assumed to share the same a-priori on both products. In fact, some ﬁrms enjoy
a better a-priori than others, through reputation effects for example (Microsoft). However, in the
context of the Internet, distribution costs for software decrease and the playing ﬁeld is leveled, so
that the analysis made in this paper is relevant.
Assoftwareareincreasinglydevelopedbasedonopenstandards(reductioninψ), andcustomers
become more sophisticated and diverse in their needs (reduction in π), shareware as a distribution
method should gain prominence. There is indeed a tendency for software ﬁrms to increasingly use
a SMS to market their product. However, this paper shows that there needs to be a reduction in
both ψ and π for a transition to a shareware marketing system to occur: For example, when ψ and
π are high, simply reducing ψ while keeping π high results in a possible transition to a shelfware
marketing system by one ﬁrm or both. A reduction in switching costs (also called friction costs)
may thus lead to a decrease in the welfare, and this to the detriment of consumers.
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A Proof of proposition 4
If the monopoly sets-up a one price system, he can sell his product at p = Ev − ϕ and make






subject to Z v
p+ϕ
(v − ϕ − p)f(v)dv − w ≥ 0
The ﬁrst expression is the proﬁt of the ﬁrm, while the constraint is that the consumer gets
positive expected value from the product. The ﬁrst order conditions of the Lagrangian are
∂L
∂w
= 1 + λ = 0
∂L
∂p
= −(1 + λ)F(p + ϕ) − pf(p + ϕ) = 0
There are therefore three possibilities, either p ≤ v − ϕ but that means the product will be
bought whatever happens so that the expected value of the product cannot be higher by being sold
via a SMS, or p ≥ v−ϕ but that means the shareware will never be bought, or ﬁnally p = 0, which
is a distinct possibility iif ϕ ∈ [v,v], or put another way, if Pr{v − ϕ ≥ 0} 6= 1. Comparing the
result of such a maximization program with the proﬁts a software could make, the monopoly will
set up a SMS only if Pr{v − ϕ ≥ 0} 6= 1 by setting a price p = 0 and extracting surplus via w.
34B Proof of proposition 5
p > Ev − ϕ was shown not to be optimal. Therefore, p ≤ Ev − ϕ and proﬁt is




Make a change of variable, z = p + ϕ. Compare




with Ev − ϕ, the proﬁt if a shelfware marketing system is used. The function to study is
therefore




which is increasing in ϕ. Denote E(v|v ≤ E(v)) = ϕ∗ and make a change of variable, ϕ = ϕ∗+λ.
Rewrite g as










Multiplying this by F(Ev):















The ﬁrst part of the expression is increasing in z and is less than 0. The third part is negative











whichisincreasinginz asf islogconcave[Bagnoli-Bergstrom(1989)]. Thesecondpartistherefore
a quasi-concave function. It is equal to 0 for z = v and z = Ev, and it is therefore negative for
any z ∈ [0,Ev]. Therefore, g can be positive only for λ ≥ 0. Since the third and ﬁrst parts are
increasing with z,and the second part is maximum for z = E(v), and I must have z ≤ E(v), I will
have z = E(v).
35C Proof of Proposition 6
“1” denotes the ﬁrst chosen and “2” the second chosen. Consider any couple of prices [p1,p2].
Suppose that p1 < p2. 1 is chosen ﬁrst, and p2 ≤ π∆ − ψ is necessary for 2 to be sold as a second
choice. U1 = πv −ϕ−p1 +(1−π)(Ev −ψ −p2) > πv −ϕ−p2 +(1−π)(Ev −ψ −p1) = U2
so that 1 can raise p1 until p1 = min[p2,Ev − ϕ]. Suppose now that p1 = min[p2,Ev − ϕ] ≥ 0.
Firm 2 has an incentive to slightly lower its price unless p1 = 0 or Ev − ϕ ≤ (1 − π)p2. Suppose
p1 = 0. If p1 = p2 = 0, then proﬁt is 0 for both ﬁrms. This is not an equilibrium because g > 0
and therefore, ﬁrm 2 has an incentive to increase its price to g so as to make proﬁts (1 − π)g > 0.
Suppose now that p1 = Ev − ϕ < p2 and Ev − ϕ ≥ (1 − π)p2. 2 is tempted to lower its price
under p1. Each ﬁrm then needs to lower its price only by a small amount in order to be chosen
ﬁrst, and increase its proﬁt, so that this is not a pure equilibrium. Finally, if p1 = Ev − ϕ < p2
and Ev − ϕ ≤ (1 − π)p2 then ﬁrm 1 has an incentive to increase its price to max[p2,g] so as
to be chosen second and make higher proﬁt than if it was a ﬁrst choice. However, that results in
0 > U2 > U1 and no product is bought, so that proﬁt is 0 for both ﬁrms. Therefore, in that situation,
ﬁrm are in a prisoner’s dilemma and choose a mixed strategy over the pair [Ev − ϕ,g]. There is
therefore no pure equilibrium strategy for this game as for any couple of prices [p1,p2] one of the
ﬁrms has an incentive to change its price.
Look now at a strategy that consists in putting a probability on setting a price according to the
distribution f with support [x,X]. Suppose that parameters are such that X ≥ π∆ − ψ ≥ x. M
is the probability mass that is put on value g by the other shelfware. ε being the smallest monetary
unit, denote g+ = g + ε and g− = g − ε. One ﬁrm follows the strategy f,x1,X1 and the other
the strategy h,x2,X2. x, X, f and h are such that the strategies form a Nash equilibrium. One
ﬁrm can set price g and get payoff g if the price of the other is higher than g, which happens
with probability H(X2) − H(g+), payoff
g+(1−π)g
2 if the price of the other is g, which happens
with probability M, and payoff (1 − π)g if the price of the other is lower than g which happens
with probability H(g−) − H(x2). The strategy h,x2,X2. is a Nash equilibrium if the other ﬁrm
is indifferent between setting price g and any other price in its support. Therefore, on the support
[x1,X1]: For p < g,
p(H(X2) − H(p)) + (1 − π)p(H(p) − H(x2))
= g(H(X2) − H(g+)) + M
g + (1 − π)g
2
+ (1 − π)g(H(g−) − H(x2))
and for p > g,
p(H(X2) − H(p))
= g(H(X2) − H(g+)) + M
g + (1 − π)g
2
+ (1 − π)g(H(g−) − H(x2))
36because if p > g, then you have no chance to sell as a second choice. The shelfware will set
a price p ≤ g because that allows it to get higher expected payoffs given a strategy of the other
shelfware that has support on [x2,X2] with X2 > g > x2. More precisely, if X1 > X2, then it is
straightforward to see that ﬁrm 1 has an interest in lowering X1 since it has no chance to sell. By
symmetry, X2 = X1. Now, if X1 > g, then lowering X1 by ε and increasing the mass M on g
proportionally increases the proﬁts of the ﬁrm as
ε(H(X2) − H(X2 − ε)) ≤ (F(X1) − F(X1 − ε))
g + (1 − π)g
2
X1 will therefore be lowered to g and by symmetry X2 = g. Our condition then becomes:
p(1 − H(p)) + (1 − π)pH(p) = M
g + (1 − π)g
2
+ (1 − M)(1 − π)g
The maximum price that the shelfware will set is a price p = g − ε if there is a mass M on g
by the other shelfware, because that gives it expected return of
g−(1 − (1 − M)) + (1 − π)g−(1 − M) ≥ M
g + (1 − π)g
2
+ (1 − M)(1 − π)g
By symmetry, M = 0. Our condition then become that
p(1 − H(p)) + (1 − π)pH(p) = (1 − π)g
and
H(p) =
p − (1 − π)g
πp
for p belonging to the interval [(1 − π)g,g].
D Proof of proposition 7
D.1 Proof of Lemma 1
If one product is chosen ﬁrst, the other ﬁrm can set prices that give it positive proﬁts by being
chosen second. To prove this, it is sufﬁcient to show that it will be bought if the ﬁrst sampling by
the customer gives a bad result, because this is easier done than if the ﬁrst sampling gave a good
result. Look at both cases, one where the customer bought the shelfware ﬁrst and got value v, and
one where the customer tried the shareware ﬁrst and realized it had value v.
If the customer buys the shelfware ﬁrst, and gets value v, then the shareware will be tried if
π max{v,v − p − ψ} + (1 − π)max{v,v − p − ψ} − w ≥ v
and bought with probability π if p ≤ ∆ − ψ and probability 1 if p ≤ −ψ. If p ≤ −ψ then
proﬁts p + w must be less than g while if −ψ ≤ p ≤ ∆ − ψ then proﬁts πp + w must be less than
37π(∆−ψ) therefore the shareware will choose −ψ ≤ p ≤ ∆−ψ and πp+w ≤ π(∆−ψ) and will
be bought with probability (1 − π)π.
If the customer tries the shareware ﬁrst, and ﬁnds its value to be v, then the shelfware is bought
if
π max{v,v − p − ψ} + (1 − π)max{v,v − p − ψ} − P − ϕ ≥ max{v − p − ϕ,0}
Suppose that p ≤ −∆ − ψ. Then that would mean the shelfware is not bought. But if p ≤
−∆−ψ, then proﬁt of the shareware is p+w which must be more than 0. Suppose that p+w = 0,
then E(Share) = Ev−ϕ but E(Shelf) = πv−ϕ+(1−π)(Ev−ψ)−P so that for P ≤ π(1−π)g
then E(Shelf) > E(Share). Since g > 0 and the alternative for the shelfware is not selling at
all, the price P will be set lower than π(1 − π)g, so that the shareware is not tried ﬁrst. Suppose
then that −∆ − ψ ≤ p ≤ v − ϕ. Then P ≤ Ev − π(v − p) is necessary for the shelfware to be
bought. Suppose now that −∆ − ψ ≤ p ≤ v − Ev
π . Then for P sufﬁciently low, it would be the
shelfware that would be bought ﬁrst. Therefore, p ≥ v− Ev
π and the shelfware is bought with some
probability after the shareware is tried with P > 0. Suppose now that −ψ ≥ p ≥ v − ϕ. Then
Ev − ϕ − P ≥ (1 − π)(p + ψ) is necessary for the shelfware to be bought. This is true for any
P ≤ Ev−ϕ since p belongs to [v−ϕ,−ψ]. Finally, if p ≥ −ψ, then if P ≤ Ev−ϕ the shelfware
will be bought with probability (1 − π) when the shareware is chosen ﬁrst.
D.2 Proof of Lemma 2
The method of resolution is as follows: There are various thresholds for p from the diagram of
choices. Since v ≤ ϕ−ψ ≤ v different diagrams are obtained according to whether p ≤ −∆−ψ,
p ∈ [−∆ − ψ,v − ϕ] or [v − ϕ,−ψ] or [−ψ,v − ϕ] or [v − ϕ,∆ − ψ] or p ≥ ∆ − ψ. To simplify
the demonstration, note that either the ﬁrm is indifferent between setting p at one extreme or the
other of the interval, and then p can be set at one of those extremes, or the ﬁrm is not indifferent, but
then, that means it is optimal to set it at one or the other extreme, since this is a linear maximization
problem. Therefore, without loss of generality, p can be set at each extreme of the interval, and then
the choice of w studied. In each of the relevant intervals for p, there are conditions that ensure that,
after choosing to buy or try one product ﬁrst, the other product will be tried or bought. Looking at
each combination of the conditions found above, there are conditions that ensure that one product
or the other will be chosen ﬁrst. I look below at each combination of conditions for any choice of p
and prove that if the shareware is chosen ﬁrst, then U(Share) = U(Shelf) i.e. the shareware will
saturate the constraint that ensures it is chosen ﬁrst. But then the shelfware will deviate by lowering
P a bit so as to be chosen ﬁrst. Therefore, this will prove that there is no pure strategy equilibrium
where the shareware is chosen ﬁrst, as that would mean either that the shareware could raise its
proﬁts by increasing its prices, or that the shelfware could lower its price and increase its proﬁts.
For p ≤ −∆ − ψ, if the shareware was chosen ﬁrst, then the shelfware would make no sale,
38which is not compatible with lemma 1.
For p ∈ [−∆ − ψ,v − ϕ], rewriting the diagram 4 , and computing conditions that ensure
one product will be bought after the other, if the shareware is to be chosen ﬁrst (i.e. U(Share) >
U(Shelf)) then that means P ≤ π∆ − ψ + π(p + ψ) is necessary for the shelfware to sell. If
p + w ≤ π∆ − ψ, then πp + w ≤ P + (1 − π)ψ is necessary for the shareware to be chosen
ﬁrst. Combining P ≤ π∆ − ψ + π(p + ψ) and πp + w ≤ P + (1 − π)ψ together, this means
that w ≤ π∆, and since p < −ψ then it is the constraint that the shareware be chosen ﬁrst that is
the most binding, and it will therefore be saturated. Check that if p + w ≥ π∆ − ψ, one gets an
incompatibility with the condition that the shareware be chosen ﬁrst.
For p ∈ [v − ϕ,−ψ], look at the case where p = −ψ - the other extreme where p = v − ϕ
was studied above - If p + w ≤ π∆ − ψ and P ≤ Ev − ϕ, the shareware is chosen ﬁrst if
P ≥ πp + w − (1 − π)ψ. Since v ≤ ϕ − ψ, once again, of the constraint that w ≤ π∆ and
w ≤ P + ψ ≤ Ev − ϕ + ψ, it is the last one that is binding, and therefore it will be saturated.
For p ∈ [−ψ,v − ϕ], look only one extreme of the interval, or p = v − ϕ. w ≥ 0, as setting
w ≤ 0 can only increase the value of the “shelfware ﬁrst” alternative, and therefore cannot allow
to make the shareware bought ﬁrst. If πp + w ≤ π(∆ − ψ) and P ≤ πp − (1 − π)ψ then
E(Share) ≤ E(Shelf) as w ≥ 0 and therefore the shareware is chosen second and the shelfware
always bought. If πp + w ≤ π(∆ − ψ) and P ≥ πp − (1 − π)ψ then the shareware is chosen ﬁrst
if πp + w ≤ P + (1 − π)ψ. The shelfware will set its price at the maximum it can get as a second
choice, or Ev − ϕ, and the shareware will set its price at the maximum such that it is chosen ﬁrst,
or Ev − ϕ + (1 − π)ψ, as this is less than π(∆ − ψ) since v ≤ ϕ − ψ. If πp + w ≥ π(∆ − ψ)
and P ≥ πp − (1 − π)ψ then in order to sell, which is a necessary condition according to Lemma
1, the shareware must set πp + w ≤ (1 − π)π∆ + πP, which is compatible with the condition that
πp + w ≥ π(∆ − ψ) iff P ≥ g. But then, as v ≤ ϕ − ψ, g ≥ Ev − ϕ and the shelfware would not
make any sale, which contradicts lemma 1. If πp+w ≥ π(∆−ψ) and P ≤ πp−(1−π)ψ then as
above, the shareware must be chosen ﬁrst to make any sales, and this translates into π(1−π)p+w ≤
π(1 − π)(∆ − ψ). But π(∆ − ψ) ≥ π(1 − π)(∆ − ψ) + π2p as p ≤ ∆ − ψ. Therefore there is a
contradiction between πp + w ≥ π(∆ − ψ) and πp + w ≤ π(1 − π)(∆ − ψ) + π2p.
For p ∈ [v − ϕ,∆ − ψ], let us again study only the case where p = ∆ − ψ. Then, when the
shareware is tried ﬁrst, the shelfware is always bought if P ≤ min[Ev−ϕ,v−ϕ−(1−π)(p+ψ)]
but both elements are equal when p = ∆−ψ. Therefore, the condition that the shelfware is bought
with some probability (lemma 1) and that this probability is 1 (lemma 2), are equivalent. Here,
lemma 2 is a consequence of lemma 1.
Finally, p > ∆ − ψ would mean that the shareware is never bought, which would contradict
lemma 1.
D.3 Proof of Lemma 3
Suppose that w < 0. Then the shareware is always tried. Since P ≥ 0, the shareware is tried before
the shelfware is bought, since trying it may make the P expense not necessary, in case the value of
39the shareware is found to be high. According to lemma 1, the shareware cannot be bought when its
value is found to be low, because that would mean the shelfware would never be bought. According
to lemma 2, it is not possible that the shareware be bought whenever its value is high, because that
would mean that the shelfware would be bought with probability less than 1− Note that it is not
possible that the shareware is bought whenever its value is high and the shelfware is also bought
in that case, because since w < 0, p > 0 if the shareware is to make positive proﬁts. Therefore,
the customer will not buy the shareware ﬁrst and then buy the shelfware whatever happens. He
will prefer buying the shareware only after having bought the shelfware and found its value to be
low, because that saves him the expense p in some cases. Therefore, since it is not possible that the
shareware be bought whenever its value is high, and since the shareware must however sometimes
be bought, that means the shareware will be bought only if its value is found to be high and the
value of the shelfware is found to be low. v ≤ v −p−ψ is also necessary, otherwise the shareware
would not be bought even in the above case. This means that by setting w < 0, the shareware
cannot make higher proﬁts than w + (1 − π)π(v − v − ψ). It will therefore increase w up to 0.
D.4 Proof of proposition 7
The formal proof will go like this : Either the shareware is chosen second, or it could be chosen
ﬁrst when w = 0. Without loss of generality, the shareware is chosen second - this also includes
the special case where w = 0 as the customer is then indifferent between trying it before or after
buying the shelfware: He knows he will in any cases try the shareware and buy the shelfware.
The shareware, as it is chosen second, can set its price p ≤ −ψ such as to be bought whenever
vShelf =v. Then v ≤ Ev − ψ − πp − w is necessary. He can also set its price p ≥ −ψ such that it
is bought only if vShelf = v and vShare = v. Then π(v −p−ψ)−w +(1−π)v ≥ v is necessary.
The shareware will set p ≥ −ψ as this gives proﬁts π(∆ − ψ), which is more than π∆ − ψ, the
maximum proﬁt if p ≤ −ψ.
Given this, the shelfware will set its price at the highest such that it is chosen ﬁrst and customers
get positive utility. Whatever the choice of p in the allowed interval, P cannot be raised higher than
Ev − ϕ, which is the stand alone value of the shelfware. But it is also not necessary to lower P
below this value.
This value for P guarantees that U(Shelf) > U(Share) but also that U(Shelf) ≥ 0,so that
customer do enter the process of choice.
The shelfware will not deviate as this can only lower its proﬁts. The shareware can deviate by
changing its price so as to be chosen ﬁrst - or in the case where w = 0, so that it is bought whenever
vShelf = v - The expected value of choosing the shelfware ﬁrst when P = Ev−ϕ is (1−π)(π(∆−
ψ) − πp − w) while the expected value of choosing the shareware ﬁrst is π(v − ϕ − p) − w. The
latter is
higher than the former if πp + w ≤ Ev − ϕ + (1 − π)ψ. The shareware will therefore not




40Formal proof From preceding lemmas I only have to worry about the conditions that ensure that
the shareware is tried and bought after the shelfware is bought and found to be of value v. I showed
in the outline of the proff above that the shareware will set p ≥ −ψ because then the shareware will
be bought only if its value is found to be high, which increases the surplus it gives to customers -
they spend ψ only if the value of the shareware is found to be high - Therefore choosing p ≥ −ψ
maximizes the proﬁt of the shareware.
Whatever p ∈ [−ψ,∆ − ψ], and given that πp + w = π(∆ − ψ), the shelfware will set
P = Ev − ϕ and has no incentive to deviate from that price. Given this price P, I look at the
best deviation for the shareware, i.e. the deviation that gives it the highest proﬁt. Comparing that
deviation proﬁt to the proﬁt without deviation, the condition that ensure this last proﬁt is higher
than the deviation proﬁt is sufﬁcient to have a pure equilibrium strategy.
Suppose that p = −ψ. Then w = π∆. P cannot be raised higher than Ev−ϕ in an equilibrium
where the shelfware is chosen ﬁrst, because that would mean that U(Shelf) < 0. The shelfware
will not deviate by setting a price lower than Ev − ϕ, because as long as P > −ψ, it would
anyway be bought only 1 − π times if the shareware was tried ﬁrst. Given a price P = Ev − ϕ,
U(Share) < 0, so that indeed the shelfware is bought ﬁrst. This reasoning can be replicated for
p = v − ϕ and p = ∆ − ψ.
Now, given a price P = Ev − ϕ, what is the deviation that gives the highest proﬁt for the
shareware? Intuitively, this deviation must maximize U(Share). U(Share) is highest when prices
p and w are chosen such that the shareware is bought whenever it is found to be of value v, but not
in any other cases, while the shelfware is bought whenever the value of the shareware is found to
be of value v. In that case, U(Share) = π(v − p − ϕ) − w while U(Shelf) = (1 − π)(π(∆ −
ψ)−πp−w) and U(Share) ≥ U(Shelf) iff πp+w ≤ v −ϕ−(1−π)(∆−ψ). Comparing this




The intuition above is proven by showing that for any choice of p and w the shareware will not
be able to make a higher proﬁt than v − ϕ − (1 − π)(∆ − ψ) when P = Ev − ϕ. For example, if
the shareware deviates by setting a price p ≤ −∆ − ψ, then U(Share) = Ev − ϕ − p − w while
U(Shelf) = (1−π)(π∆−ψ−p−w)andU(Share) ≥ U(Shelf)iffp+w ≤
Ev−ϕ−(1−π)(π∆−ψ)
π .
This later expression which is the highest proﬁt the shareware can make if it deviates by setting
p ≤ −∆−ψ, is lower than v−ϕ−(1−π)(∆−ψ), the maximum proﬁt found before. Replicating
that reasoning for each choice of p, the condition on π that is in the proposition is found to be the
most stringent for an equilibrium to exist.
E Proof of proposition 8
G(p)denotesthestrategyoftheshareware. Thestrategyofthesharewaredependsonlyonpbecause
w = 0. G(p) is the cumulative probability to set a price lower than p. This strategy must make the
shelfware indifferent between various levels of prices. H(P) denotes the strategy of the shelfware.
41Since w = 0, I can safely assume the ﬁrst thing the customer does is buy the light version of the
shareware. Then, the shareware can set a price p such that it is bought whenever its value is found
to be high, or bought only when its value is high and the value of the shelfware is found to be low.
The ﬁrst case obtains if
v − p − ϕ ≥ πv + (1 − π)(v − p − ψ) − P − ϕ
or
p ≤
P + (1 − π)ψ
π
Then proﬁt of the shareware is πp and that of the shelfware is (1 − π)P.
In the second case, where p ≥
P+(1−π)ψ
π , then proﬁt of the shareware is π(1 − π)p and that of
the shelfware is P.
Let us denote VShelf the expected proﬁt of the shelfware under the mixed strategy equilibrium,
and VShare that of the shareware.
The shelfware puts a probability M on setting P = Ev − ϕ, while the shareware put a proba-
bility m on setting p = ∆ − ψ. The support of the G distribution is [p,p] × ∆ − ψ. p is the lower
limit of the G distribution, and p is the upper limit of the connected part of the G distribution’s
support. The support of the shelfware’s H distribution is [P,Ev − ϕ] and is connected. H− is the
H distribution over [P,Ev − ϕ[.
The strategy G of the shareware must be such that
P(1 − G(
P + (1 − π)ψ
π
)) + (1 − π)PG(
P + (1 − π)ψ
π
) = VShelf
The strategy H of the shelfware must be such that
πp(1 − H(πp − (1 − π)ψ)) + π(1 − π)pH(πp − (1 − π)ψ) = VShare
Suppose m > 0.
Then, VShare = π(1−π)(∆−ψ)sinceH(π(∆−ψ)−(1−π)ψ) = H(π∆−ψ) ≥ H(Ev−ϕ) =
1.
Then,
H(πp − (1 − π)ψ) =
p − (1 − π)(∆ − ψ)
πp
This c.d.f must verify the two following conditions:
• p = (1 − π)(∆ − ψ) (the support of G must not include values lower than this, since this
value already puts H to 0)
• p =
Ev−ϕ+(1−π)ψ
π (since H(P) = H(Ev − ϕ) = 1)




42M to belong to the interval [0,1] as:
1 − M = H−(Ev − ϕ) =
1
π
− (1 − π)
∆ − ψ
Ev − ϕ + (1 − π)ψ
v ≤ ϕ − ψ ensures M ≥ 0 and π ≥
q
ϕ−ψ−v
∆−ψ ensures M ≤ 1.
Now,
P(1 − G(
P + (1 − π)ψ
π
)) + (1 − π)PG(
P + (1 − π)ψ
π
)
= (m + (1 − π)(1 − m))(Ev − ϕ)
so that
G(
P + (1 − π)ψ
π
) =
P − (m + (1 − π)(1 − m))(Ev − ϕ)
πP
This c.d.f must verify the two following conditions:
• P = Ev − ϕ since G(p) = 1 − m.
• P = (m+(1−π)(1−m))(Ev −ϕ) but since
P+(1−π)ψ
π = p and p = (1−π)(∆−ψ) then
P = π(1 − π)(∆ − ψ) − (1 − π)ψ
I must have P ≤ P, which translates in π ≥
q
ϕ−ψ−v
∆−ψ . This also ensures that m ≤ 1.
The other conditions is that m ≥ 0 which translates in v ≤ ϕ − ψ − πψ, or π ≤
ϕ−ψ−v
ψ .
If that is not the case, then m = 0. In that case,
VShelf = P = (1 − π)P






(Ev − ϕ + ψ)
while in the same fashion
p =
Ev − ϕ + (1 − π)ψ
π
Since




Ev − ϕ + (1 − π)ψ
and M obviously belongs to the [0,1] interval. In the same obvious manner, p ≥ p. Finally, the
shareware will deviate by setting m > 0 because when v ≥ ϕ − ψ − πψ, then VShare under this
43equilibrium is more than π(1 − π)(∆ − ψ), the shareware’s proﬁt under the equilibrium where
m > 0.
This gives the payoffs of each ﬁrm and their equilibrium mixed strategy distribution.
ItiseasytocheckthattheboundsforpandP satisfytherequirementthatforanyrealizationofp
and P, each product has a positive probability to be bought. When [p,P] = [p,P], since p ≤ ∆−ψ
and P = Ev − ϕ, the situation cannot be worse than in the pure equilibrium, and indeed, the
consumer may buy both products. When [p,P] = [p,P], the consumer buys the shelfware ﬁrst, but
still will want to try the shareware if vShelf = v. ﬁnally, if [p,P] = [p,P], the consumer tries the
shareware ﬁrst, but will still want to buy the shelfware if vShare = v.
F Proof of Proposition 9
Prices are set such that both products have positive sales. A ﬁrm that is chosen second will not try to
compete for customers who were satisﬁed with their ﬁrst choice, but will set its price so as to attract
customers who were disappointed with their ﬁrst choice. It will therefore set p ∈ [v − ϕ,v − ϕ] so
that if no product is found of high quality by the customer, he buys none, and if it is found to be of
high quality, he buys it.
In a ﬁrst stage, either one product is chosen ﬁrst or second, and the condition that E(Share1) ≥
E(Share2) translates in πp1 + w1 ≤ πp2 + w2. In that case, 2 will set π(v − ϕ − p2) − w2 = 0
and 1 will set π(v − ϕ − p1) − w1 = 0. 1 makes higher proﬁts than 2. Therefore, this is not a pure
equilibrium strategy.
Firms adopt a MSE such that each product is tried with probability 1, and is bought with some
probability, whatever the price choice of the other. Schematically, this limits strategies to those that
keep (p1,p2,w1,w2) in the region outlined below.
(Graph 11 p. 45)
Intuitively, those MSE are optimal from a welfare point of view, which is a justiﬁcation for
concentratingonthem. Thisdoesnotmeantheyaretheonlyonestoexist. Firmswillcompetebased
on the value πp + w which is the total expected cost of a shareware. This makes the equilibrium
found very similar to the one found in shelfware competition, with πp + w replacing P. There
remains to prove that if one ﬁrm sets its prices such that it is always tried and sometimes bought,
e.g. w1 = 0, p1 ≤ v − ϕ, then the other one has no incentive to set its prices such that the other
ﬁrm’s product is sometimes not tried. Suppose that indeed w1 = 0. Then 2 knows 1 will always be
tried. Suppose it sets its prices (w2,p2) such that 2 is sometimes bought even if v1 = v and v2 = v.
The limit case where it can happen with the highest probability is when p1 happens to be set at v−ϕ
so that the condition is that with some probability v−ϕ−p2 ≥ 0. But raising the lower limit for the
distribution of p2 above v−ϕ can only increase proﬁts of 2. Therefore, p2 > v−ϕ with probability
1. As for the setting of w2, it is straightforward to see that the couple (w2,p2) will be set such as
to guarantee the product is tried whatever the price choices of 1, i.e. πp2 + w2 ≤ π(v − ϕ) with
44Figure 11: The limits on the variations on p and w when two shareware ﬁrms compete.
probability 1 so as to capture the possibility of being bought second - the same reasoning as that
of the proof for the shelfware competition mixed equilibrium strategy is used. From the shelfware
competition part, the support for πp + w will be [(1 − π)(π(v − ϕ)),π(v − ϕ)] and the mixed
strategy must guarantee (1 − π)(π(v − ϕ)). The density function for πp + w is such that
G(πp + w) =
πp + w − (1 − π)(π(v − ϕ))
π(πp + w)
G Proof of proposition 10
The proof is straightforward using the 2 × 2 payoff matrix and studying how the payoff compare




∆−ψ . Then when two shelfwares are competing, one will always be tempted





2(v−ϕ) , the proﬁt of a shelfware in competition with a share-
ware, πShelf(Shelf,Share),ishigherthanwhatitwouldmakeifitswitchedtoaSMS,π(Share,Share).
Firms then choose a mixed strategy. Each one chooses a SMS with probability
α1 = (1 +
Ev − ϕ − (1 − π)π(v − ϕ)
(1 − π)2ψ
)−1
If πShelf(Shelf,Share) ≤ π(Share,Share) and π(Share,Share) ≥ π(Shelf,Shelf),
then there will be shareware vs shareware competition : when a shelfware switches to a SMS then
45the other one will also switch, and the proﬁts under shareware competition is higher than proﬁt
under shelfware competition.
If πShelf(Shelf,Share) ≤ π(Share,Share) and π(Share,Share) ≤ π(Shelf,Shelf),
then ﬁrms are caught in a prisoner’s dilemma. Even though a ﬁrm knows that the other one will
imitate when it switches to a SMS and that the end result - shareware competition - is less proﬁtable
than shelfware competition, it still beneﬁts from switching to a SMS if the other one does not.
Suppose now that
ϕ−ψ−v
ψ ≥ π ≥
q
ϕ−ψ−v
∆−ψ . When there is shareware competition, one ﬁrm
will deviate whenever ψ ≤
π(ϕ−v)
1+π , which is always true in this domain. However, when there




π(ϕ − v − 2ψ)
< α1
Suppose ﬁnally that π ≥
ϕ−ψ−v
ψ . When there is shareware competition, no ﬁrm wants to de-
viate, while if there is shelfware competiton, one ﬁrm will want to deviate if ψ ≥
ϕ−v
2 , which is
always true in this domain. Firms therefore choose the SMS.
H Proof of proposition 11
Expected social welfare under shelfware competition is πv −ϕ+(1−π)(Ev −ψ) of which ﬁrms
get an expected payoff of 2(1 − π)(π∆ − ψ), which gives an expected welfare for consumers
of Ev −ϕ−(1−π)(π∆−ψ). Expected social welfare under shareware competition is π(v −
ϕ) + (1 − π)π(v − ϕ) of which ﬁrms get an expected payoff of 2π(1 − π)(v − ϕ), which gives an
expected welfare for consumers of π2(v − ϕ). Expected social welfare is higher under shareware
competition: π2(v − ϕ) ≥ Ev − ϕ − (1 − π)(π∆ − ψ) since π ≥
ψ
ϕ−v − 1. Expected social
welfare is higher under shareware competition than under shareware vs shelfware competition:
π(v−ϕ)+(1−π)π(v−ϕ) ≥ Ev−ϕ+(1−π)π(∆−ψ) since π ≤
ϕ−v
ϕ−v−ψ while social welfare
under shareware vs shelfware competition is higher than under shelfware competition: Ev − ϕ +
(1 − π)π(∆ − ψ) ≥ πv − ϕ + (1 − π)(Ev − ψ))
Shareware vs shelfware competition when π and ψ are such that a pure equilibrium exists,
reduces consumers’ welfare to 0.
When comparing welfare across the different (π,ψ) domains where the equilibrium payoffs of
ﬁrms differ, it is when the probability for a ﬁrm to choose a SMS is the highest that the welfare will
be the highest.
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